Category: Constitutional Law

GR 147780, 10 May 2001

Doctrine:

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that “[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion . . .

FACTS

1. 1 May 2001 – President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a state of rebellion in the NCR. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected.

2. Petitioners (in 4 consolidated petitions) assailed the declaration of a state of rebellion and the warrantless arrest allegedly affected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law.

3. 6 May 2001 – President Macapagal-Arroyo lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion in Metro Manila. 

ISSUE

Is the declaration of a “state of rebellion” violative of the doctrine of separation of powers?

RULING: NO

1. SC: “Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution expressly provides that “[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion . . .”

2. SC: “[p]etitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.”

GR 159402, 23 February 2011

Doctrine:

Not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized.

FACTS

1. Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T58894 of the Baguio City land records with an area of 985 square meters, more or less, was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO).

2. 11 August 1995 – respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00; ATO failed to pay.
   
3. ATO and its co-defendants invoked Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents’ affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. 

4. 10 November 1998 – the RTC denied the ATO’s motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense. 

5. 10 December 1998 – the ATO commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to assail the RTC’s orders. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, upon its finding that the assailed orders were not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent

RULING: YES

CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. 

1. SC: “[r]eiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, the Supreme Court declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity.”

2. SC: “Not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized.”

3. SC: “[t]he need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen.

4. SC: “ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit.”

GR L-30671, 28 November 1973

Doctrine:

“It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent.”

FACTS

1. July 1961 – a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings.

2. 24 June 1969 – Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute the said decision. This was reinforced by the issuance of Alias Writ of Execution on June 26, 1969.

3. The Alias Writ of Execution directed the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to serve notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks, specially on the monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits, sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution. The Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969.

4. As per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP Comptroller, “[t]he funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank or their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

5. 7 July 1969 – a petition was filed by the Republic of the Philippines questioning the validity of Judge Villasor’s order.

ISSUE

Whether or not the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is valid

RULING: NO

The order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution are nullified and set aside.

1. Judge Villasor acted not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. He acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

2. SC: “It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent.”

3. SC: “[t]he State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature.”